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58 vikling og kultur m.m. for at kunne forstå 
den fremmede kontekst, hvori firmaer og 
deres udsendte medarbejder agere. Også 
dét, har Morten Pedersen styr på.
Alt i alt er bogen resultatet af en impo-
nerende præstation, og jeg kan kun an-
befale den varmt – også for dem, der vil 
blive klogere på vores fælles danmarks-
historie. Uanset hvad man mener i DR, er 
F.L. Smidth & Co. en del af Danmark, og 
det samme er alle andre danske virksom-
heder – og i kraft også af dem er Dan-
mark blevet et moderne velfærdssamfund 
og en integreret del af den globale verden. 
Eneste seriøse anke fra denne anmel-
der er, at det havde været mere givtigt og 
ambitiøst, hvis Morten Pedersen havde 
positioneret sin afhandling i forsknings-
feltet om Born Globals (når der nu skal 
teori med), hvilket kunne have styrket 
hans egen analyse samt bidraget til ud-
viklingen af forskningsfeltet, der bl.a. om-
handler globale, højteknologiske nichein-
dustrier. Den mulighed forpasser han for 
i stedet at fremlægge endnu et eksempel 
i en efterhånden lang række af eksempler 
på, at der er andre veje til internationalise-
ring end Uppsala-modellen fra 1970erne. 
Bogen har potentiale til langt mere end 
det!
Kurt Jacobsen 
shipyard gates are closed. He goes further 
examining what happened to the ship-
yard employers and production facilities 
after the closure. Through the original re-
search setting, Olesen contributes to cen-
tral questions in history of industrial trans-
formation and longevity.
The background for the story is the 
European shipyard crisis caused by global 
overcapacity in shipbuilding and competi-
tion against the cost-efficient Asian ship-
yards. In comparisons with other western 
European shipyards, Denmark endured in 
the stiff competition reasonably well and 
long thanks to the technical specialization, 
efficient production, and close connections 
to the Danish shipping companies. Yet, in 
the 1980s, accumulated difficulties together 
with the unfeasible price level forced also 
the well-established shipyard owners to 
reconsider their possibilities to continue in 
business. The timing and the direct cause 
of the shipyard closures may have varied 
in different countries and at different ship-
yards but everywhere the termination of 
the shipbuilding was experienced as a 
great tragedy for the local community. In 
this historiographic genre of the shipyard 
crisis, Olesen’s study strikes the reader as 
a rather optimistic story pointing out that 
there is life after the end of a business. 
The study is based on Olesen’s PhD 
thesis completed in 2012. As is typical for 
books originating from doctoral projects, 
the study has a pedantic style, carefully 
considered arguments, and clear conclu-
sions. The author builds his theoretical 
framework on the foundation of Joseph 
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The success of a nationally important in-
dustry brings about heavy-weight studies 
of widespread interests. Downfall of the 
once successful business is possibly even 
a more intriguing topic for an historian of 
industrialization. Thomas Roslyng Olesen’s 
book examines the downscaling and re-
structuring of large Danish steel shipyards, 
B&W in 1980, Nakskov Shipyard in 1986-
1987, Allborg shipyard 1987-1988 as well 
as the closures of the reconstructed B&W 
shipyard in 1996, and Danyard Frederiks-
havn in 1999. In concert with the large 
array of maritime economic histories, the 
author demonstrates the complex inter-
connections between the locally con-
centrated industrial cluster and the inter-
national market forces. Yet, the author 
does not stop his presentation when the 
last ship leaves the building berth and the 
59Schumpeter’s concepts of creative de-
struction and innovative entrepreneur. The 
length of the theoretical part is restricted 
in the published work. Unlike doctoral the-
sis, published history books seldom accom-
modate extensive literature reviews or 
theoretical discussion. If something, one 
would have hoped some words about the 
modern innovation studies after the 1940s. 
For Schumpeter, an innovative entrepre-
neur is the primus motor of the creative 
destruction that drives the industrial 
transformation. This study focusses on 
the creative part of the entrepreneurial 
activities after the global market forces 
have taken care of the destruction and 
forced the managers to run down ship-
building. The large shipyards and con-
crete building berths manifest the mate-
rial dimension of shipbuilding but Olesen 
concentrates on the human part of the 
business: entrepreneurship and knowhow. 
Through the five case studies, Olesen 
is able to scrutinize the variance among 
the shipyard closures. He calculates alto-
gether twenty-seven spin-off companies 
that were established after the five ship-
yards were closed. The spin-off compa-
nies are classified into four categories 
based on their field of business and rela-
tions to shipbuilding: 1) new companies 
continuing shipbuilding of some sort, 2) 
companies engaged in shipbuilding as 
sub-contractors such as producing steel 
constructs or machinery, 3) companies 
establishing power plants, 4) consulting 
business and 5) repurposing the shipyard 
facilities as business parks. 
sibilities to move to other industries were 
shaped by the geographical location and 
economic situation. Engineers typically 
continued selling their knowledge and 
expertise through consulting. Old mana-
gers and local businessmen were active 
in business that employed or repurposed 
the real estates or machine shops at the 
closed shipyards and required more ca-
pital. In overall, the story resonates well 
with the overall switch from labour-inten-
sive blue-collar industry to knowledge-
intensive business of highly educated engi-
neers. 
Through the five cases, the two deca-
des, versatile source material, and research 
setting that combines qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, Olesen provides the 
historiography of European shipyard crisis 
with a valuable contribution. The study 
underlines how the creative destruction 
is always characterized with breaks as well 
as continuities. It is also a surprisingly hu-
man story: The shipbuilders might have 
been lucky when they succeeded, but they 
were certainly not stupid when they failed. 
Saara Matala
The analysis demonstrates the impor-
tance of place and time in the industrial 
transformation. The yards which were 
closed in 1980s were large production 
sites with several activities and provided 
suitable launching pads for new business. 
As a contrast, the yards in the 1990s were 
already streamlined production units. This 
is clear especially when comparing the 
B&W shipyard in the 1980s and the re-
constructed B&W shipyard in the 1990s. 
The shipyard’s marine engine production 
and power plant that continued despite 
the shipyard closed in the 1980s, were 
already outsourced in the 1990s.   
The spinoff activities were funded by 
the old owners, local businessmen, or 
foreign companies. When the shipyard 
had a strong owner with sufficient capital 
reserves, the ownership of the spinoff 
companies usually remained in Denmark. 
In other cases, the investors came from 
western Europe. What is remarkable, as 
Olesen points out, is the lack of govern-
mental financing. The absence of the state 
strikes as a great contrast to the historio-
graphy of the shipyard crisis in Sweden. 
With the help of statistical follow-up 
study on the shipyard workers, Olesen 
converts the downscaling of the Danish 
shipbuilding from a tragedy to a story of 
industrial transformation. Of the blue-
collar workers, the majority moved to 
the other branches of steel and machine 
industries, or directly to the service sec-
tor. On average, from 60% to 70% of the 
shipyard employees had found a new job 
in three years after the closure. Their pos-
